Standing Committee F

[Mrs. Marion Roe in the Chair]

Hunting Bill

Clause 8 - Tests for registration:

Amendment proposed [this day]: No. 100, in 
clause 8, page 3, leave out lines 11 to 14 and insert— 
 '(1) The test for registration in respect of proposed hunting is that its utility in preventing or reducing environmental damage outweighs any suffering that may be an unavoidable result of the hunting. 
 (2) In subsection (1) ''environmental damage'' means damage to—.'—[Mr. Gray.]
 Question again proposed, That the amendment be made.

Marion Roe: I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:
 Amendment No. 101, in 
clause 8, page 3, line 26, leave out subsection (2).
 Amendment No. 174, in 
clause 8, page 3, line 27, leave out from first 'that' to end of line 30 and insert 
 'the proposed hunting is not the cruellest method of making the contribution mentioned in subsection (1).'.
 Amendment No. 24, in 
clause 8, page 3, line 30, leave out 'significantly.'.
 Amendment No. 175, in 
clause 8, page 3, line 30, at end add— 
 '(3) The Secretary of State shall give guidance to the registrar as to the relative cruelty of— 
 (a) trapping and ensnaring, 
 (b) gassing, 
 (c) poisoning, 
 (d) shooting with a rifle by day, 
 (e) shooting with a rifle by night, 
 (f) shooting with a shotgun by day, 
 (g) shooting with a shotgun by night, 
 (h) shooting with an air gun, and 
 (i) killing by dogs.'.

Marion Roe: Before I call Mr. Öpik, I would like to ask hon. Members to stand in their places if they wish to catch my eye to be called to speak. I remind hon. Members that the same conventions apply in the Committee Room as in the Chamber. I am afraid that winking, thumbs up signs and nodding will not do.

Lembit Öpik: Maybe they are winking because they like you, Mrs. Roe, and who could blame them. [Interruption.] I thought that was quite good, actually. To the disappointment of my hon. Friend the Member for St. Ives (Andrew George), I have not finished my speech. It will delight everyone to learn that the interval has allowed me to condense
 what I was going to say, so I will be able to keep my comments under two hours.
 I intend to cover two issues. The first is standardised versus comparative measures of suffering. The second is such measures and the need for objectivity in them. The first issue has vexed me considerably. I hope that the Minister will reflect on that, and respond at the end of the debate. The other point has already been made by my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Worcestershire (Mr. Luff), but I want to cover some of the philosophical points that accompany it. 
 The hunting hearings are at the heart of much that we are discussing. They are certainly at the heart of the amendments—including amendment No. 174—that the Middle Way Group has proposed. I remind hon. Members that the key matter that we are discussing does not concern the efficiency of the various methods—in other words, the number of foxes it is possible to kill by various methods. This morning, we were falling into the trap of that debate. The key issue is suffering and the definition of cruelty, and how that relates to the methods of fox killing used. 
 I also remind hon. Members that we are not debating whether to kill foxes. That route is a red herring in relation to any of the amendments. We have already accepted that foxes will be killed. The question must be how and the extent to which one particular method—hunting with dogs—should or can be singled out while maintaining cohesion in this element of the Bill.

Eric Martlew: Can the hon. Gentleman explain whether he believes that hunting with hounds is a form of pest control or a sport?

Lembit Öpik: In my constituency, there is no question that the overwhelming reason why individuals go foxhunting with dogs is pest control. In many upland and highland areas, it is the primary method of fox control. Lord Burns pointed that out in his inquiry. I am willing to be intervened on if I am going too far, but I hope that most hon. Members accept that point. In the specialised case of upland mid-Wales, for example, there is a case to allow hunting with dogs as a means of pest control. I remind the hon. Gentleman that there are questions, which came up in the three-day inquiry, about conservation and recreation.
 Another crucial element of agreement in the three-day inquiry was recreational use being included in the term ''utility''. However, we need to return to that point at a later stage because it is covered by clause 8(1). I suggest to the hon. Gentleman that we might have a more extensive discussion about that matter when we get there.

Michael Foster: Will the hon. Gentleman confirm that he draws a distinction between the type of hunting with dogs that goes on in upland areas, which is pest control, and, by definition, the hunting that goes on in lowland areas of England and Wales, which is not pest control?

Lembit Öpik: To be clear—the hon. Gentleman's views are clear—there is a degree of alignment between
 my view and about half of what he said. In other words, in areas such as mid-Wales, the fells and elsewhere, hunting with dogs is primarily regarded as a form of pest control. There is also a social element to it, but that is not the main reason that people go hunting there. Oftentimes, such groups tend to be regarded as foot packs because they use dogs but are not always on horseback. As my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Worcestershire outlined, the justification for hunting in other areas is not primarily to control fox numbers, but there is a countryside management element to it. We should talk about that issue when we discuss clause 8(1). There is a debate to be had about whether recreational use should be included in that list, but we should leave it until we come to it.

Eric Martlew: The hon. Gentleman referred to fell packs. On Second Reading, I made a speech that led an irate joint master of a fell pack to ring me up. He said that it was a disgrace that I should suggest that his hunt used artificial earths, but also said that the Blencathra hunt had three artificial earths. What is the point of having artificial earths if it is a matter of pest control; surely they are just for recreation?

Nicholas Soames: On a point of order, I am afraid that I am finding it difficult to hear anything from that far away. Is it possible to turn up the speakers because the hon. Gentleman is so indistinct?

Marion Roe: Order. I ask hon. Members to bear that point in mind, but I shall find out whether there is any way to ensure that everyone in the Room can hear what is being said. Will Members please raise their voices because I also find it difficult to hear what is being said?

Eric Martlew: How can artificial earths be for pest control and not recreation?

Lembit Öpik: I am keen to have that important discussion because the Middle Way Group has a lot to say about why we support the regulation of such matters. In my judgment—I shall take guidance on this—the issue is probably not relevant to clause 8(2). If the hon. Gentleman can be patient until we get to that point, perhaps we can discuss the matter in more detail. I stress that I am not evading the issue; it is just not relevant to this section of our discussions.
 It is worth remembering that before the break in this morning's sitting there was a lot of discussion about measuring relative cruelty and the definitions of words. It is important that we are all consistent in our use of terminology and the Minister made a similar point when he intervened on the hon. Member for North Wiltshire (Mr. Gray). If we mix up the words, we will mix up the argument. It is clear that cruelty is an assessment of two other factors: suffering and utility. It is absolutely vital that we are clear about the definition in clause 8(2). As I understand it, the assumption is that when the utility of an action exceeds the suffering, it is not cruel but when the utility of an action is exceeded by the suffering, it is an act of cruelty. There is, of course, a problem in measuring 
 those elements but I nevertheless think that the principle behind the Bill demands that we acknowledge those definitions to be correct. For that reason, as we were discussing in earlier amendments, it is not really relevant whether shooting 126 foxes suggests that using guns is a more effective means of fox control. That does not matter in terms of what clause 8(2) is trying to achieve. It is trying to decide not the efficiency of a method, but where that method comes in the cruelty equation of utility versus suffering. 
 Another point, before I turn to amendment No. 174, is that in introducing such a measure, we can probably assume that the utility of killing a fox will be the same whatever method is used. If we are going to kill a fox, we can factor in a constant for utility. What varies is the suffering, according to the different methods used. That basically means that to make the comparisons required under clause 8(2), we need some way of measuring the relative suffering caused by each individual method. I hope that that is a fairly clear exposition of the facts, and not terribly controversial. 
 The Middle Way Group has tabled amendment No. 174 because we think that there is a flaw in setting a condition for one method of killing a fox—with dogs—but not factoring in all the other methods that could be used. Philosophically, the reason is simple. If we pass this legislation, the mechanics of clause 8(2) could mean that methods that are more cruel could be used instead of hunting with dogs—assuming, of course, that there are methods more cruel than that. In my view, that completely contradicts what the Bill is attempting to achieve. Another principle that emerged during the hunting hearings, I believe from all sides, was the need to ensure that the welfare of the hunted animal is maximised by the prevention of any undue suffering. That is the prime concern. 
 Amendment No. 174 is trying to get rid of the cruellest method, rather than simply looking at hunting with dogs. Our assumption, as my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Worcestershire has already said, is that there is a continuum of different methods and that it is not strategic to examine hunting with dogs in isolation because it could produce that rogue result. My hon. Friend also mentioned some concerns about shooting. I shall save time by not repeating those, but we all know that one of the unknowns is the extent to which wounding rates can substantially affect that cruelty equation. 
 The Minister said that there are no restrictions on hunting rats or rabbits with dogs, because that method of controlling the population satisfies the two tests and causes less suffering than alternative methods of control such as poisoning or snaring. We are trying to discover, through amendment No. 174, the evidence to prove that snaring causes more suffering than hunting with dogs and whether, if the Minister's assumption that snaring is a relatively cruel method compared with hunting for rats and rabbits, it follows that the snaring of foxes would also cause increased suffering. We are asking an evidence-based question, which underlines the danger of the consideration of reasonableness in clause 8(2). I hope that the Minister can give an evidence-based response to explain why, if 
 it is all right to kill rats and rabbits with dogs, it is not all right to do the same to foxes, and why the converse goes for snaring. 
 We are also trying to tease out, through amendment No. 174, a point whose importance I had not fully realised until our discussion today. There is a danger that clause 8(2) will allow everything to carry on or nothing to carry on, depending on how ''reasonable'' is defined. More to the point, unless we seek some form of standardisation, instead of banning cruelty, we could simply ban activities that cause relatively more or less suffering but which, in our judgment, should be allowed to continue. 
 If hunting were banned, presumably we would not tell people who wanted to kill foxes that they were allowed to use only one method. We would make an implicit assumption—I hope that all hon. Members accept this—that people would sometimes use snares or gas, or would shoot. Shooting involves many different categories of guns and they necessarily cause various degrees of suffering. If that is correct and even if hunting with dogs was banned, we would need to have some idea of the relative suffering that each method would cause to maintain the spirit of clause 8(2). It does not seem logical, if we must do that anyway to be consistent with the primary objective of improving animal welfare, to single out hunting with dogs for that consideration and not everything else. 
 My suggestion in amendment No. 174 is that, however we approach this part of the Bill, it is important to look objectively at the relative suffering that all methods of killing foxes are likely to produce.

Alun Michael: I am following the hon. Gentleman's argument carefully and with interest. He is making a valid point. The Bill deals with hunting with dogs. If dogs are to be used to hunt a quarry species, the test in clause 8 requires a comparison to be made and a question to be asked: is there a way that involves less suffering which passes the utility test? The Bill covers only what is acceptable in the case of hunting with dogs. Other legislation, going back to the Protection of Animals Act 1911, covers human activities in relation to wild animals. The Bill does not cover that. All that is required under the Bill is to ask whether options other than hunting with dogs are available to the person seeking to undertake a particular activity.

Lembit Öpik: I take the point that the Minister makes and we are coming close to the point made by the right hon. Member for Suffolk, Coastal (Mr. Gummer) at our previous sitting: inconsistency. I shall return to that in a moment.
 The Minister's argument is reasonable only if it is assumed that there will be consistency in all legislation. I do not want to reopen our useful debate on Tuesday, but I remind all hon. Members and the Minister that one of my great concerns, and that of other people too, is the application of precedence from one Bill to another circumstance. That will concern coarse fishermen and shooters. They will read the record and see what the Minister said about provisions being separate, but there is a lot of precedent in the House for examples being taken from one Act to justify 
 changes elsewhere. That goes back to the point about universality. I am nervous, philosophically and practically, about doing something in the Bill and assuming that it is a stand-alone example for the sake of hunting with dogs and that anglers and shooters can be reassured that it will not be taken to justify changes elsewhere.

James Gray: The hon. Gentleman is right in everything that he is saying. The Minister made a fundamental error in what he said a moment ago: that the Bill applies only to hunting with dogs. It was drafted that way because he chose to do so, but the fact that amendment No. 175 was found to be in order and has been selected for discussion demonstrates that it is possible for the Bill to include other methods of dispatching foxes; namely, shooting, snaring, gassing and so forth. Such methods are listed in amendment No. 175. The amendment is in order and, as such, the Bill should be amended to include such methods.

Lembit Öpik: There is a difference of view. I, along with the hon. Members for North Wiltshire and for Mid-Worcestershire and others, feel that we should take a more holistic, universalising position on the matter. As I understand it, the Minister is comfortable with confining the Bill to hunting with dogs.

Alun Michael: The hon. Member for North Wiltshire is wrong to make the connection that he has made. The relevance of any activity other than hunting with dogs is simply to provide a test of whether hunting with dogs is less cruel and involves less suffering than other ways of addressing a particular purpose that is shown to be necessary. We are limited to hunting with dogs. It is not my choice but Parliament's. Parliament has repeatedly said that it is necessary to deal with hunting with dogs. It was part of our manifesto commitment and the Bill has been drafted on that basis. I shall make further comments about consistency later.
 The Bill is about hunting. The relevance of other activities is limited to whether mechanisms are available that can achieve the same virtuous end—the same utility—without involving the degree of suffering that might be involved in hunting with dogs.

Lembit Öpik: I certainly accept that the Minister has drawn the same short straw that a former Home Secretary of the same name did in being confined to talking about hunting with dogs. We are trying to show that this is not an appropriate way to legislate on the matter and have tried to highlight the issues.

Peter Luff: Frankly, the Minister is wrong. If he had animal welfare at the centre of his concerns, as the Middle Way Group has, he would not have introduced the Bill at all but would have produced a much wider-ranging Bill or embraced the Bill that the noble Lord Donoughue has introduced in the House of Lords. He introduced this Bill not because he is concerned about suffering, which is what the amendments deal with, but because the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals has spent huge amounts persuading the British people of something that they no longer believe. If he listened to public opinion, he would drop the Bill completely.

Lembit Öpik: If the Minister is right and what has gone before limits him to discussing only hunting with dogs, so be it. However, I do not believe that that is the case, because all the parties involved in the three days of hearings agreed that the core objective was the consideration of animal welfare. The Middle Way Group suggested also the question of civil liberties, which would be a second priority for most organisations, including us.
 If animal welfare is the core issue but it turns out that the Bill is not in the best interests of animal welfare, I hope that the Committee will have the good sense to propose modifications. Let me give an example: imagine that the research that the Middle Way Group is conducting shows that shooting is, on balance, more cruel than hunting with dogs. In that case, if one method is to be regulated to improve animal welfare, it should be not hunting with dogs but shooting. We cannot predict the findings of our research. However, if it shows that hunting with dogs is the cruellest method, the Middle Way Group will be honest about it. We will share the findings and alter our view accordingly. 
 The difficulty is that one method, hunting with dogs, has been arbitrarily chosen and put at the centre of the Bill. We have tried with amendment No. 174 to alter the focus from hunting with dogs to animal welfare. I accept that the Minister has restrictions, not least the political pressures from his own party. However, I ask him to consider an important question. Is he personally committed to producing the most animal-welfare focused legislation or is he saying that, even if there is evidence to the contrary, he is bound to assume that hunting with dogs is worse than all the alternatives and legislate accordingly? If the latter is the case, the Minister is putting the Committee in a tremendously inflexible position and compromising, to some extent, its opportunities to amend the Bill.

Alan Whitehead: In attempting to avoid the Scylla of cruelty in relation to shooting and hunting with dogs, perhaps the hon. Gentleman has bashed into the Charybdis of allowing the invention of a more cruel method of dealing with foxes, such as repeatedly smashing a fox's head in with a brick, which would enable foxhunting to be seen as less cruel and so able to continue. Does he accept that that could be a real—although possibly unintended—consequence of amendment No. 174?

Lembit Öpik: It is an unintended consequence. As my hon. Friend the Member for St. Ives conceded, we could have drafted the amendment a little better and we will not push it to a vote. The hon. Gentleman's intervention relates to an issue that really concerns us. By taking one specific method, there is a danger that we will do unintended harm to animal welfare. He accurately described that. I am making assumptions about some of the words that he used because I have only a C in O-level Latin—[Hon. Members: ''Greek.''] That is even worse. I have just proved my point.

Gregory Barker: Before we get carried away, we should remember that gratuitous cruelty to animals is already a criminal offence. We are discussing the relative cruelty of shooting and maiming
 a fox and hunting it to an instant death with dogs. Gratuitous cruelty is rightly already illegal under criminal law.

Lembit Öpik: That does not necessarily apply to hunting wild mammals.

Alun Michael: It does not apply to hunting because hunting is exempt from the requirement not to be cruel and that is precisely why hunting needs to be addressed. I take the point that there are sometimes unintended consequences of dealing with one issue and one has to deal with those consequences in the legislation or in other legislation. I point to the consultation on wider animal welfare issues, to the comments made by the Under-Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs earlier and to the intention to legislate on issues of animal welfare in the relatively near future. We are able to consider things in the round as well as considering what is in the Bill.

Lembit Öpik: I am encouraged by the possibility of a joined-up approach. My worry is that by focusing in a free-standing way on one arbitrarily chosen method of killing foxes, we will miss the big picture. We have already talked about shooting. I cannot emphasise enough that if animal welfare is the core consideration, we should be thinking about it in a strategic way, rather than picking out one method, which may not even be the most cruel, and allowing others, which may be more cruel, to continue.

Peter Luff: What I am about to say has been said from a sedentary position, but it is important that it is on the record. The Donoughue Bill, when it reaches the House of Lords, would deal with the Minister's point by removing hunting's exemption and creating a level playing field for all methods of animal control across the board. The Donoughue Bill is centrally concerned with animal welfare and suffering and not with prejudice about one particular forum for controlling animals.

Lembit Öpik: One of the core principles that came out of the three-day hearing is that the use of dogs to hunt animals is acceptable in certain circumstances. We have already agreed that that is the case in relation to rats and rabbits and we have also agreed that scientific opinion is tremendously divided on the degree of suffering caused by chasing an animal. No one has any real data one way or the other as to how foxes feel about being chased. Indeed, there is a danger of personifying the fox and ascribing human attributes to it, rather than accepting that the fox always escapes until the last time. There is also no consensus on wounding figures. There was some consensus, believe it or not, about the fact that inspection and regulation can work. Those are all variables that need to be taken into account if subsection (2) is to work.
 Even if the presentation of amendment No. 174 is flawed, surely the issue still exists. The Minister could easily take the matter up later, if, after reading the record of the debate, he is persuaded that there is a salient and serious animal welfare related-concern in focusing on a method that may not turn out to be the most cruel way of killing foxes. 
 My second and final point is that whether we have comparative or standard tests of suffering, there must be objectivity to achieve that. The clause hinges on the ability of the courts of law, the registrar and the tribunals to define reasonableness. The registrar has been told to assess which method causes the least suffering and to register them accordingly. To make such an assessment, he or she needs to— 
 Sitting suspended for a Division in the House. 
 On resuming—

Marion Roe: I should like to inform the Committee that the hanging microphones in the Committee Room are unlike those in the Chamber. They are there not to enhance the sound system, but purely for the broadcasting system. Therefore, I ask hon. Members to raise their voices as much as they can, so that all Committee members can hear what is being said.

Lembit Öpik: It seems that my speech, like J.R.R. Tolkien's ''The Lord of the Rings'', comes as a trilogy. I will try and make this the final, exciting episode. Let us hope that, like ''The Lord of the Rings'', it has a happy ending.

Peter Luff: He has given it away.

Lembit Öpik: I am sorry; I should like to apologise to the filmgoers in the Chamber. The millions who read Hansard will be similarly disappointed.
 To summarise what I said in part two of my speech, it is wrong to single out one method of killing foxes when that method may not be the most unpleasant way of doing it; the method that maximises suffering. I can say explicitly that we must remember that no one here is talking about allowing cruelty. We all agree that whatever the Bill does, it should eliminate cruelty. We are discussing the acceptable level of suffering. From that follows the other crucial point that came out just before we went to vote. 
 Unless we are saying that the definition of cruelty has shifted—so that we are saying that anything that causes more suffering than the method that causes the least suffering is cruel—we have to acknowledge that more than one method will pass the cruelty test. In other words, after the Bill is passed, more than one method will generate an acceptable level of suffering. 
 Unless every single remaining method generates exactly the same amount of suffering, we are accepting that we are not minimising the suffering, but bringing it down to what we regard as an acceptable level. That is important, because if it can be shown that hunting with dogs does not produce an unacceptable level of suffering, it should be allowed to remain in the bag of options that a person who wants to kill a fox has at their disposal. That is of crucial importance. 
 I hope that the Minister will consider the issue, which follows from this morning's discussion about the amendments, including amendment No. 174. An obvious example would be that of halal meat, an issue that we covered in the earlier debate. It is clear to me that, even with improvements, the halal method of 
 killing an animal probably is not one that minimises suffering, but we accept that it is not cruel because of the total utility versus suffering balance. If we take the implication of the clause, we should ban halal methods and all those that are worse than the one that causes the least suffering. It is a complicated matter to explain, but it is a simple concept. We either re-define cruelty in the way in which I described, or we accept that we need a threshold level of suffering above which things are cruel and should not be done, and below which things are not cruel and should be permitted. 
 I suggest that whether we have a comparative method, which I think is dangerous, or a standardised model with a threshold of suffering above which there is cruelty and below which there is not, we have to have specific measures. That is the spirit of amendment No. 174, and that is what it was designed to achieve despite its flawed construction. In simple terms, we are asking the registrar to assess which methods cause the least suffering. To do that, the registrar must have criteria, and it seems appropriate that those criteria are laid out. 
 Wounding rates, for example, will be a significant consideration when it comes to comparing hunting with dogs with shooting. If the wounding rate is, say, 50 per cent.—it will not be that high—and only about 50 per cent. are killed, many of us would think that that method was much more cruel than killing a fox with dogs, where death is instantaneous. The length of time the animal remains wounded before dying would be a consideration, as would the catch to kill interval and the length of time the prey is held back from the predator or trap before it dies. Maiming non-target species, and by-catches in the case of snares, would also be considerations, as well as the natural selection of sick and weak animals. 
 We have already seen an example of the fact that nobody knows for sure about the chase. Professor Webster said some powerful things, and pointed out that the fox is never scared, because it always gets away until it is killed, so it is accustomed to escaping. [Laughter.]

Peter Luff: It is all very well hon. Members laughing, but those of us who were at the Portcullis house hearings heard those arguments carefully adduced by experts; those arguments were not a laughing matter. To be fair to everyone who participated, including the Campaign for the Protection of the Hunted Animal, their views were listened to in respectful silence. Where an expert has given a view—the Minister is to be congratulated on his initiative—it should be listened to in the same respectful silence in the Committee.

Lembit Öpik: One of the frustrations for those of us who were at those hearings is that hon. Members have made points in this Committee that were clearly resolved there. We are having to educate members of the Committee who were not at the hearings by pointing out matters that achieved consensus in the hearings but now seem to be open to debate again. The point about the chase is one of the core ones.
 A fox would behave in the same way if he saw the hon. Member for Worcester (Mr. Foster) and his family walking through a field as it would if it saw 
 dogs. Although I sometimes find the hon. Gentleman formidable, I do not believe that the fact that the fox runs off necessarily means that it is terrified of him. Therefore, we must be careful not to make assumptions based on hearsay about the evidence that we are requiring the registrar to put together to make the comparative assessment provided for in subsection (2)

John Gummer: I would not like the hon. Gentleman to be unfair to Labour Members, because they have been led down this line by the Minister. The Minister's finished our last debate by saying, ''We should not listen to other people, to philosophers or others. We must make our own mind.'' One of the things that we must do here is listen to people who know and then make up our minds. The serious point here is that many people in the Committee appear not to be listening to those who have the experience, whether it is philosophical or theological on the one hand or practical or veterinary on the other. All they do is bring in their prejudices and giggle if anybody disagrees with them.

Alun Michael: The right hon. Member for Suffolk Coastal has, I think, misquoted me. Perhaps he will check the record. If he can find the point at which I said that people should not be listened to, I should be interested to know where it was.

Lembit Öpik: Presumably I now have to give way to the right hon. Member for Suffolk Coastal. [Hon. Members: ''No, he's off.''] No doubt there will be an answer to that question soon.
 I use the chase as an example of where an assumption has been allowed to inform the debate. The registrar cannot be expected to operate on that kind of speculation. If the Minister is saying that the registrar is responsible for establishing a standard, we can have a debate about that. However, someone—either ourselves as legislators or the registrar—will have to create an objective comparative standard to give the Bill a chance to work. [Interruption.] I believe that the Minister is about to have his answer from the right hon. Member for Suffolk, Coastal, to whom I give way.

John Gummer: That is kind of the hon. Gentleman. The Minister said:
''The only point that has been unhelpful is the suggestion that we must look to the interpretation of individual philosophers to reach a conclusion. Our obligation in the Committee is to think for ourselves.''—[Official Report, Standing Committee E, 7 January 2003; c. 48.]
 If he thinks that it is not worth listening to anybody who knows about anything, but merely makes up his own mind, he is entirely wrong.

Alun Michael: On a point of order, Mrs. Roe. May I interpret the right hon. Gentleman's remarks as an apology for the misinterpretation and twisting of my words in which he sought to engage?

John Gummer: Further to that point of order, Mrs. Roe, may I ask the Chair not to take my remarks as an apology? They are not an apology; they
 are a statement of the fact that the Minister cares not about people who know, but about his own opinions.

Marion Roe: Order. That is not a point of order. We should get back to the amendment.

Lembit Öpik: Since my speech has gone on for four hours and one minute, I am keen to reach a conclusion. I find the argument of the Minister and the right hon. Gentleman offensive because I have a 2:1 in philosophy from Bristol university, and my tremendous philosophical education should not exclude me from participating in the debate. [Interruption.] I can assure all hon. Members that my degree was done in English; at least that is what the university told me.
 The point about the standard is a core one. Whichever way one interprets the judgment of whether there should be a more strategic consideration of all methods of killing—my views on that are obvious—we must have an objective standard by which the registrar can operate. 
 The purpose of amendment No. 174 was to ask the Minister those questions. Does he accept the point that criteria must be set by us or by the registrar before suffering can be assessed? The answer to that is obviously yes, so does he also accept that to achieve that, we need to have a more objective assessment of the relative suffering caused by different methods than is currently available? What assessment method does he envisage the registrar using? It would be reasonable for anyone considering taking on that role to get guidance from the Government as to the assessment method. 
 If standards are set, will they be applied as a matter of principle to all the legal methods, or will the Bill apply them on a discriminatory basis to one method, or perhaps several? If balance restrictions are not to be placed on some of the other legal methods such as shooting and snaring, will the Minister be comfortable—even if it turns out through the necessary measurement of standards that a ban on hunting with dogs makes the situation worse because the measures introduce more, rather than less, cruelty—with allowing that anomalous situation to proceed?

Rob Marris: Has the hon. Gentleman read clauses 15 and 26 of the Bill, which specifically refer to information that might be available to a registrar to help him or her make their decision?

Lembit Öpik: Yes, I have. Clauses 15 and 26 may be where the Minister would like to give more explicit guidance about the list. I am comfortable that it can be done within the confines of the Bill, which is the point that the hon. Gentleman tried to raise. At the moment, clause 8(2), which is where it really matters, does not contain any cross-references to a specific assessment of the relative techniques, which the registrar necessarily will have to compare to be able to make an objective judgment of how they all work.

Alun Michael: As the hon. Gentleman is posing a question for me, it would be helpful if he outlined to us
 what providing an answer to his first question would amount to. What exactly is he looking for?

Lembit Öpik: I am looking for a commitment and a change to the Bill—I accept that amendment No. 174 will probably not succeed—either later in Committee or on Report to make it clear to the registrar the sorts of criteria that he or she would need to take into account to compare the relative suffering of the different available methods of killing a fox. I am asking for that because unless the registrar can quantify the relative suffering of the different methods, it will be absolutely impossible for him or her to achieve what is specified in clause 8(2), which is a comparison of the various techniques.

Alun Michael: I am still not quite clear what the hon. Gentleman is looking for. The registrar will have to look at the information available on the degree of suffering involved in a particular pest control approach; for example, information on the types of poison available as an alternative way of dealing with a particular species. One would expect the registrar to draw on that sort of information, depending on what is available at the time. Science moves on and evidence is provided over a period of time. I am not sure what the Secretary of State would add to the available evidence.

Lembit Öpik: The Minister has made a tremendously important contribution. I shall be happy to give way again if I am misinterpreting his remarks, but I think that he is accepting that this provision requires an objective, comparative assessment of the relative degree of suffering caused by all the methods involved for the registrar to reach the conclusions required under clause 8(2). If the Minister is saying that, we have reached a very important alignment. To have that on the record will make it much more straightforward for the registrar to carry out his or her work.

Alun Michael: Of course the registrar will have to take decisions on the basis of the evidence available. That will include the evidence put forward by the applicant in seeking to make a case for being registered and any counter-evidence provided by the designated animal welfare organisation, which might suggest something other than what is in the application. It will also include guidance from previous tribunal decisions, which will have to be taken into account. The Bill contains the capacity for the tribunal to seek additional information where necessary to provide evidence, a point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Rob Marris). The Bill covers those matters in what I suggest is a sensible and balanced way.

Lembit Öpik: I find the Minister's contribution very helpful. It seems to me that the Minister—speaking for the Government—and the Middle Way Group are in agreement that there must be an objective ability to measure the suffering in all the different methods. It is almost common sense to say that, but I think that it is the first time that we have explicitly acknowledged the point in this Committee.
 That leads me to a question for the Minister. We now all agree that there must be an ability objectively to measure the relative degree of suffering caused by all the various methods, including hunting with dogs. If it turns out, as it could, that, empirically speaking, hunting a fox with dogs does not cause more suffering than other methods not being managed under the Bill, such as shooting, how will the Minister respond to such information? 
 The Minister should not be in that situation. We should have the facts. I think that, in the three days of hearings, we saw that hunting with dogs is not necessarily more cruel than the alternatives that will remain. The challenging question for the Minister when he replies is this; if it turns out that hunting with dogs causes less suffering than the existing alternatives, how can he justify a Bill that is focused on not the cruellest method of fox control? That is not a rhetorical question, and unless the Minister can answer it plausibly, it will serve to highlight the fact that we have arbitrarily chosen one method of fox control. Doing that, and passing the Bill with this clause as it stands, could serve merely to increase cruelty in the countryside, not reduce it.

Colin Pickthall: Briefly, I wish to comment on one or two of the points that have been raised thus far. I apologise because I have a very sore throat; if I get too quiet, I will start miming.
 The hon. Member for North Wiltshire made considerable play of his fear that because cruelty and utility are enshrined in the clause, other people following on from the Bill would apply them to angling and shooting. One understands why the pro-hunting lobby makes that argument; it is a perfectly proper campaigning point. Those concerned are involved with a sport—I would not call it a sport, but I cannot think of another word for it—that is currently acceptable. It is not a mass recreation, and the pro-hunting lobby needs a mass participant sport—angling—to get behind its argument. That would make it politically stronger.

James Gray: The hon. Gentleman seems to be alleging that that point was raised by the pro-hunting lobby. I quoted his hon. Friend, the Member for Reading, West (Mr. Salter), one of the most passionate and long-standing opponents of foxhunting. He makes the point that if the Bill became law, fishing inevitably would be included. That is a direct quotation from The Daily Telegraph.

Colin Pickthall: I do not suppose that is the only occasion on which my hon. Friend the Member for Reading, West has been wrong. It is a pity that he is not on the Committee to clarify his arguments. Those who opposed virtually every Bill that I can remember have raised the ''thin end of the wedge'' argument. Everyone who has debated other Bills before will remember opponents making that argument.
 I gently ask the hon. Member for North Wiltshire and the hon. Member for Montgomeryshire (Lembit Öpik), who made the same point, to reflect on the fact that Labour has been in power for seven years, with a huge majority that expressed its wish overwhelmingly in the House on two occasions to ban hunting with 
 dogs. We still have not got that ban seven years later. Can anyone imagine the political reality behind an argument that says that those few people in the country—I believe that they are few—who wish to ban angling or shooting are going to make that a reality through the parliamentary process? It is totally impossible.

Peter Luff: I honestly do not recall using the thin end of the wedge argument in Committee. If I have, I shall stand corrected. Does the hon. Gentleman seriously think that if the Bill is passed as currently drafted and hunting is banned, the League Against Cruel Sports or People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals will just pack up their bags and go away? They will move on to the next issue. It may be greyhound racing, fishing or shooting, but they will move on to something else. Such organisations do not pack up their bags and go away. They will use the precedent of the Bill to advance their arguments. It may take 10 or 20 years, but they will use it, and those other activities will suffer. I invite the hon. Gentleman to reflect on that with great seriousness.

Colin Pickthall: The hon. Gentleman has just used a classic thin end of the wedge argument.

Peter Luff: That is the first time that I recall having used it. It can indeed be perfectly characterised as the thin end of the wedge.

Colin Pickthall: I accept that it is the first time that the hon. Gentleman has used the argument in discussing the Bill, but we have all heard it used. Let us be honest; we have used it ourselves. I spent five years in opposition to the Major Government and, on every Bill Committee, we used the thin end of the wedge argument whenever we could to try and make a point.

Rob Marris: It never works.

Colin Pickthall: Absolutely. The hon. Member for Mid-Worcestershire is right. Some people in the animal organisations and elsewhere will wish to pursue the line that he has described and do something about angling, shooting or whatever it may be. It could get down to the protection of head lice, for all I know. People already do such things; significant numbers already express the opinion that angling and shooting are cruel. I disagree with them.

Michael Foster: Could my hon. Friend name a member of the House who wants to see angling banned?

Colin Pickthall: No; frankly, I could not. I recall that in the Committee that considered the Bill on hunting with dogs last time, my hon. Friend the Member for West Ham (Mr. Banks) said that, in principle—I am paraphrasing from memory—he did not like or agree with angling. In an exchange with the hon. Member for Mid-Sussex (Mr. Soames), his argument was that we must all draw the line at some point and we might all wish to draw the line in a different place.
 When we discussed that Bill, I found myself confused on the issue of rabbits and uncertain as to how I would argue and vote on it. However, to get something as substantial as a ban on hunting with 
 dogs, angling or whatever people might fancifully imagine, one must have majority support, political support and political support in Parliament. Can anybody conceive of a future Labour Government, most of whose Back Benchers do not support action against angling or shooting—quite the reverse—allowing such a law to go through, unless the Opposition were convinced by the arguments?

Lembit Öpik: Aside from the hon. Member for Broxtowe (Dr. Palmer), I know of no one who wants to ban those things, but I accept that he is in a minority. Is the hon. Gentleman saying that because so many people do those sports, even if they fail the tests that we risk passing now it is good government to ban this sport but not those? It sounds as if he is focusing on a method, while we are trying to focus on animal welfare. Does he accept our strategic argument that the Bill needs to focus on animal welfare? To ban an individual method that might not be the cruellest one surely contradicts what he wants to achieve with the Bill.

Colin Pickthall: I am not trying to fudge an answer to the hon. Gentleman, but I intend to come to that point in a moment.
 The hon. Member for North Wiltshire made a significant contribution to the debate this morning, and he was followed by the hon. Member for Mid-Worcestershire. In his anecdote about his acquaintance who went out with a bunch of shooters and massacred 126 foxes, he effectively killed off the long-standing argument of pro-hunters that fox hunting is necessary to control pests. The hon. Member for Mid-Worcestershire buried it when he stood up and said, ''It is not about pest control and never should have been.'' The hunting lobby made an error when they pursued that argument, as it did on the last Bill and on the Bill introduced by my hon. Friend the Member for Worcester. The hon. Member for Montgomeryshire said that, in his constituency, hunting was about pest control. He was plain and honest about it. The Front Benchers of Her Majesty's loyal Opposition has ended the arguments about pest control.

James Gray: The point that I was making in using that anecdote about the obliteration of foxes—it occurred in a certain place at the heart of the foot and mouth disease crisis, when there was no hunting—was that the foxes were such a danger that the farmer chose to wipe them out in that way. But the good welfare management implied in the sensible use of hunting with hounds would obviate the need for that kind of obliteration. If hunting were banned, that is what we might expect. I, too, decry obliteration of the kind that I have just described. So did the farmer—that is why he told me about it. None the less, it was necessary because hunting had been banned during the foot and mouth outbreak.

Colin Pickthall: I accept that the hon. Gentleman deplored the massacre. However, his comments demonstrate the efficiency of shooting as a method of pest control. The argument in the many debates that I have heard has been that foxhunting with hounds is necessary to control foxes. It is not, and the
 Opposition Front-Bench spokesmen have accepted that implicitly and explicitly during the debate.

Lembit Öpik: You will recall, Mrs. Roe, that I resisted discussing the benefits of recreation as a utility because I felt that it was more appropriate to discuss it under clause 8(1). May I suggest to the hon. Gentleman that that would be the right time to make his point? I shall be very happy to take him on then but not when we are trying to talk about the comparative cruelty of various methods.

Colin Pickthall: Yes, I accept that.

Peter Luff: In my constituency, foxhunting is about management of the species. It makes a valuable contribution to the ecosystem of Worcestershire. In the constituency of my hon. Friend the Member for Montgomeryshire, it has a different function. We cannot generalise about foxhunting but must be specific.
 I draw attention to an article on snares in the autumn 2002 edition of Wildlife Guardian, the magazine of the League Against Cruel Sports, in which a spokesperson for the league stated: 
''It is just another cruel byproduct of the pointless bloodsport that is game bird shooting.''
 That gives a clear indication of where the wedge will next be driven.

Colin Pickthall: I speak as someone who, as a boy in Cumbria, used to set snares. In my wiser years, I have come to think that snaring is a particularly unpleasant method of pest control. What is the difference between the management of foxes and pest control? [Interruption.]
Gregory Barker rose—

Peter Luff: On a point of order, Mrs. Roe. I shall decline to answer the question, because we will debate the matter at length when we deal with utility. That would be the right place to deal with it—I do not wish to duck the argument. I simply wanted to make the point that another cruel sport has been identified.

Marion Roe: I ask Members to focus on the amendment that is before us. There will be opportunity to debate some of the finer points later in the Bill.

Colin Pickthall: I understand and accept that, Mrs. Roe. I am trying to address as briefly as I can points that were adduced by Opposition Members in their arguments about the amendments.
 At the risk of repeating myself, I want to emphasise my point. The hon. Member for Mid-Worcestershire said that we cannot generalise—he is right. I am sure that there are many constituencies such as mine where there is no hunting, but where the fox population is controlled at what I believe is a reasonable level. The animals are attractive and people see and like them. One used to run alongside my car as I drove to work. 
 In 10 years as the MP for the area—before 1997, the constituency included a much larger rural area—I have had two, perhaps three complaints about fox predation. Farmers and landowners bump them off 
 when necessary, but I am pleased to say that they do not go out and slaughter them.

Adrian Flook: The hon. Gentleman has said several times that there are foxes but no hunts in his constituency. Can he clarify how many gun packs there are in his constituency of West Lancashire?

Colin Pickthall: In my constituency, there are several farmers who will go out with a couple of dogs and shoot foxes—of course there are. They will be very interested in the Bill.
 The hon. Member for North Wiltshire argued that shooting is cruel because farmers or shooters wound foxes. I have no doubt that that happens at times but, to return to his anecdote, certainly the people who shoot foxes that I know do not often miss. For 30 years I have regularly walked around my constituency and still do. I have never yet found a wounded fox, but I have seen many live ones.

Peter Luff: The reason that one does not find wounded foxes is that they go to ground. One does not see them. They disappear out of sight and die in misery. That is the whole point of the debate. We are trying to regulate something that can be seen but ignoring more suffering that cannot be seen. My objection to the Bill is on animal welfare grounds.

Colin Pickthall: I accept that those foxes go to ground. Of course they disappear, but we also see many foxes on farms when they have been shot, carted in and dumped.

Gregory Barker: The hon. Gentleman makes a case based entirely on his own anecdotal evidence. Is there any clinical authority to which he defers in making the case that shooting foxes is more effective and causes less suffering?

Colin Pickthall: There is a whole argument there, which is an anthropomorphic one—our assessment of what happens to an animal killed by one means or another. If the hon. Gentleman will bear with me for a moment I shall come to that.
 The hon. Member for North Wiltshire said that we cannot define cruelty, only what is more or less cruel—I hope that I am not misquoting him. I do not follow the logic of that. I do not know how there can be a comparative, without a substantive to which to relate it. We cannot have a concept with no meaning but know when there is more or less of it. It must have a meaning.

James Gray: It sounds as if the hon. Gentleman is going to be extremely helpful to the Committee. Perhaps he will oblige us with a one-sentence definition of the word cruelty without using the word suffering.

Colin Pickthall: That is an interesting question. I believe that the hon. Member for Mid-Worcestershire began to wander into precisely that dichotomy between cruelty and suffering.

James Gray: What is it?

Colin Pickthall: Will the hon. Gentleman allow me? I believe—I do not expect everyone to agree, but this is how I read the Bill and think about the matter—that there is a distinction between cruelty and suffering.
 Cruelty is knowingly imposed. It is an active process where, for whatever reason—that is another argument—someone kills or damages an animal unnecessarily, in any way. Cruelty should, in my view, be defined in that way. Suffering is what happens to the animal, what the animal experiences. There are two different processes there, and I think that the two words can be defined something like that, although I would have to think it out a little more carefully.

Hugo Swire: For clarification, is the suffering of an animal that has been shot and gone to ground in Scotland, and cannot be dug out, more cruel than that of one that had been hunted by foxes and killed instantaneously or escaped?

Colin Pickthall: The answer is probably; but how would I know? I am not a fox and have never been shot, I am glad to say. I have never had to go to ground. We are all guessing what an animal feels. If I am right and cruelty is something that is imposed, in this case by human beings on an animal, there must be an intention. That intention is important. Pest control has been ruled out, so what is left other than recreation and pleasure? That is mixed with the intention of damaging, hurting or killing an animal and some human beings perpetrate that.
 With reference to the argument of the right hon. Member for Suffolk, Coastal, religious slaughtermen do not intend, in my view, to inflict cruelty. The way in which they kill animals to be eaten is traditional to their religion. They do that not for pleasure or sport, but as part of their religion. The right hon. Gentleman argued that providers of halal and other meat obtained by religious slaughter was right. They do not intend cruelty in what they do.

John Gummer: The hon. Gentleman must accept that there is also an objective measure. Otherwise, when the pederast says that he does not intend any damage to the child on whom he inflicts damage one must accept that and that the damage happens objectively. The hon. Gentleman cannot say that it is merely in the mind of the person. Morality cannot be dealt with on a subjective basis. Morality is objective and if the hon. Gentleman is suggesting that there is no objectivity in morality, he should tell his hon. Friend the Minister to drop the morality argument and merely argue the compromise position that I have suggested.

Colin Pickthall: The right hon. Gentleman is leading us into a wide argument and I would be ruled out of order if I pursued it too far. All morality is based on practicality originally—[Interruption.] Of course it is. All morality and moral belief is mitigated by circumstances. For example, people would not otherwise fight back in a war and kill people. I am in danger of being well out of order.

James Gray: Surely it is clear that the definition of morality has nothing to do with practicality. The two are opposite. Morality is a clear and absolute rule. Practicality is the opposite. My right hon. Friend's suggestion is that the Bill depends on—

Marion Roe: Order. We are definitely straying from the amendment. I ask hon. Members to focus on what is before us.

Colin Pickthall: May I reply in one sentence? I believe that the hon. Gentleman is entirely wrong and perhaps at an appropriate point in our proceedings we can have that debate, which is interesting. Perhaps we should have taken it up on the back of the right hon. Gentleman's speech on Tuesday.

Peter Luff: I shall try to remain strictly in order. It is interesting that the hon. Gentleman is ignoring one of the central conclusions of the three-day Portcullis house hearing. It was unanimously agreed that the motive behind any of the current control activities involving the killing of wild animals is irrelevant. That was absolutely common ground. The hearing decided that what mattered was the effect on the animal. That is why we should talk about suffering and utility. If suffering exceeds utility, it is cruel. The hon. Gentleman is taking us into territory into which we should not be taken because it is contrary to all the advice that we heard at the three-day hearing.

Colin Pickthall: If the hon. Gentleman is saying that we cannot come to a conclusion on or discuss something other than that which seems to have come out of the three-day hearing—I apologise for not attending it—he is wrong. We all have our views on that, and I intend to consider the Bill according to mine.

Lembit Öpik: The three-day hearing was the foundation for the Bill. If the hon. Gentleman is challenging the Bill's foundation, he must have some private conversations with the Minister. If it turns out that hunting with dogs is not the cruellest way to hunt and another method could be used in a certain circumstance, does he accept that clause 8(2) could serve to increase cruelty by proving that hunting with dogs is not acceptable on those terms? There is no regulation at all on how foxes will be killed without dogs.

Colin Pickthall: To answer that properly, I would have to go into motivation, necessity and utility at some length. Contrary to what Opposition Members believe, the matter affects not only animals but human beings. Our collective motivation in doing what we do to animals is my paramount consideration, which is why I tried to make the point about halal meat a moment ago.
 The hon. Member for Mid-Worcestershire, whose self-criticism and honesty in disagreeing with himself is very disarming, said that the issue was about not pest control but wildlife management. Again, I find that distinction difficult to understand. One manages animals in order to encourage some and discourage others. Any creature can become a pest by being in the wrong place or simply by their being too numerous. Hares are not pests, but they could become pests. If there were suddenly 4 billion of them wandering around my constituency it would be troublesome. Essentially, there is no difference between pest control and wildlife management, or at least they are very closely interlinked. No doubt we will be debating that 
 point because, given what Opposition Members have said, the Bill is essentially about pest control. 
 Returning to the point made by the hon. Member for Montgomeryshire, foxes should be shot because they are nuisances, although I agree that there is an argument about wounding. Now that the pest control argument has been knocked on the head, hunting does not have to happen. It is a matter of choice and, in the word used by Opposition Members, ''recreation''. That point must be taken into account when relative levels of cruelty and/or suffering and utility are assessed. 
 Amendment No. 175 asks for guidance on relative cruelty to be delivered by the Minister in a schedule to the Bill. If my definition of cruelty is correct—whether others agree with it is up to them—we have to consider the concept of motivation. Massive and complex guidance would be needed for those involved in the registration system on the intention to be cruel in each of the circumstances. We would have to produce philosophical works in order to pass them on to those involved. Necessity might be easier to talk about. 
 My right hon. Friend the Minister has already pointed out that the registrar must take advice from the two opposing sides of the argument. That is already in the Bill and that is surely enough. The amendment presumes that those charged with the registration and tribunal process, and no doubt with other things beyond that, cannot themselves assess cruelty and utility in the context of the Bill. That seems an almost offensive assumption. It leads us back to the odd contribution made by the right hon. Member for Suffolk, Coastal on Tuesday—I am sorry to refer to him when he is not in the Room. He said that moral guidance, which is what the amendment asks for in some measure, can be given only by senior moralists. He said that the Government have 
''not been able to adduce a series of moralists to explain''
 what their ''moral principle'' is. He referred to 
''a definition of freedom from someone who is universally respected on both sides of the House''.
 Where would one find such a person? He said that 
''it is valuable to discuss what those who have made a profession of the issue think about such matters'',
 that 
''it is very hard to find . . . moral arbiters,''
 and that 
''there must be some support for the argument among those who have objectively considered it from a philosophical or theological point of view.''
 He advised my right hon. Friend the Minister 
''to get on to a public platform and discuss it with the Bishop of Hereford,''—[Official Report, Standing Committee F, 7 January 2003; c. 43–45.]
 and he claimed that the Minister would lose. I could identify a few bishops who would be prepared to argue against hunting. There is no more a community of moral certitude among bishops than there is among philosophers.

Alun Michael: In order to demonstrate that I have sought the widest ranging opinions in coming to my
 conclusions, I assure my hon. Friend that I have discussed the issue with rural bishops.

Colin Pickthall: I am delighted to hear it. I imagine that the Minister did not find an exact agreement of views among those bishops. I do not underestimate the importance of listening to the Bishop of Hereford or even of re-reading John Stuart Mill, if that cannot be avoided. However, most ordinary citizens in this country have a broadly shared moral sense. A sense of moral outrage against cruelty is part of that. We know cruelty when we see it and we can apply the test of necessity to it. Therefore, amendment No. 175 is otiose.

Alun Michael: I am pleased that we have made some progress in relation to cruelty and utility, which are the two key issues set out in the clause. I am tempted to reflect on what seems to be the largest concentration of students of philosophy that I have ever seen in a Committee. I think that a number of us who studied philosophy are outgunned by my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test (Dr. Whitehead), who is a doctor of philosophy. I chose to read philosophy and literature because I am fascinated by the principles against which we consider a range of political and moral behaviour and according to which people think and behave. I do not regret that combination of subjects.
 I disagree passionately with the comment of the hon. Member for North Wiltshire a short time ago that the morality and the practicality are in opposition to one another. They are frequently in tension and need to be balanced. In trying to achieve good legislation, we must consider the points of principle and practicality that we seek to embody, but, for me, that is the fascination of political debate. An important point about our responsibility as legislators was made by Gibbon in chapter 20 of ''Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire''. It is a quotation that I have used on a number of occasions in relation to criminal justice legislation, but it applies to any legislation that we pass in the House. He said: 
''But the operation of the wisest laws is imperfect and precarious. They seldom inspire virtue, they cannot always restrain vice. Their power is insufficient to prohibit all that they condemn, nor can they always punish the actions which they prohibit.''
 The essential point is that legislation should not simply encapsulate our opinions but, against principles that we believe to be important, should make good law. That is why during recent months, when I have been considering the principles of utility and cruelty and the way in which we can apply them effectively to the issue of hunting with dogs, I have considered at great length the practicality of the Bill, as well as the principles that underlie it and the enforceability of the law.

James Gray: The Minister picked me up on an intervention that I made a moment ago, which sadly proved to be out of order. None the less, his reaction to this point may be in order. I hope that it is.
 My point was made firmly by my right hon. Friend the Member for Suffolk Coastal on Tuesday—that there are two possible ways of approaching this question. Either one takes a moral approach, in which case the answer that one comes to must be equally applicable to all human activities, an absolute 
 yardstick against which one measures one's behaviour, or one takes a practical approach, as the Minister seems to be saying he is doing, which is to say, ''Let us find the most practical and effective way to ban fox hunting.'' That is the dichotomy that I seek to point out.

Alun Michael: I understand that dichotomy, but in any legislation one must find the right principles to apply and then apply them in a practical manner. Those two points are not in conflict with one another but are two elements that need to be applied in creating good law.
 That is why I have tried to find the right principles that a fair-minded person might reasonably regard as common sense in deciding what is acceptable and what is not acceptable in the ways that we use dogs to protect livestock and crops and the other elements set out in subsection (1), which describes the principle of utility. At the same time I have tried to construct a practical and workable Bill that will be strong and effective in implementation. That balance is enormously important in the design of legislation.

Hugo Swire: For the record, does the Minister believe that the law enacted in Scotland by his colleagues is practical, enactable or in any way good?

Alun Michael: The law that was introduced in Scotland was an attempt by members of the Scottish Parliament to make good law. I have reservations about its effectiveness. That legislation may take a great deal longer to settle down than the Bill. However, to be certain of that, one would need to know all the details of the Scottish situation and the way in which the law applies. My hon. Friend the Member for Dumfries (Mr. Brown) may have a view on that from his knowledge of the practicalities. I am concerned about some of the things that I have heard about the initial attempts to get around the intentions of the Scottish Parliament. It was for them to make their law. I hope that we have avoided any dangers that may be problems in relation to it. I do not want to judge that legislation.
 In considering the right principles, I do not think that anyone other than the right hon. Member for Suffolk, Coastal, who is not here at the moment, has questioned my willingness to listen to all views and to examine all sources of evidence and information before coming to a conclusion. Having undertaken that, I have come to a conclusion and take responsibility for the Bill that I have put before the House. 
 I was not saying that we should not regard the philosophies of all practical people. However, at the end of the day, each of us—particularly those of us on this Committee—has to take responsibility for our decisions in relation to the Bill. In view of the invitation to us to consider the comments of philosophers, it may be of interest to note that John Stuart Mill clearly stated that it was the responsibility of Government to legislate to prevent cruelty to animals. That was an exception to his principle of non-interference. Those who wish to pursue that 
 should look at ''The Principles of Political Economy'' in book 5, chapter 11—''Of the Grounds and Limits of the Laisser-Faire, or Non-interference Principle''. They will find that he put forward the reasons for legal intervention in favour of the lower animals: 
''It is by the grossest misunderstanding of the principles of liberty, that the infliction of exemplary punishment on ruffianism practised towards these defenceless creatures, has been treated as a meddling by government with things beyond its province; an interference with domestic life.''
 Finding a strong view expressed philosophically by John Stuart Mill, or quoting one of the conclusions of the Burns report, which I have done in response to comments from colleagues, may help us towards our conclusions but it takes away none of the responsibility that we have to examine the arguments and the evidence to reach our own conclusions. That is what makes our Committee one of the most interesting to be a member of, particularly as a Minister.

Gregory Barker: If I may pull the Minister away from philosophy and back to the issue of cruelty, he said that he considered a great deal of evidence in considering the issue. I am sure that he has. Given that Lord Burns, after all the evidence he took, was unable to say emphatically that fox hunting was more cruel than shooting foxes, could the Minister say what the clinical or scientific evidence of cruelty was that led him decisively to reach his conclusion? Edmund Marriage in his submission to Lord Burns estimated that of the 135,000 foxes shot in the UK each year, 40 per cent. are left wounded. What evidence tipped the Minister over the edge into concluding that hunting with dogs was more cruel than shooting?

Alun Michael: The hon. Gentleman asks me to answer a question based on his formulation. I have read a considerable amount of material from Edmund Marriage, who has been assiduous in putting forward his views and supporting evidence. I can see that I am not the only person who has heard of that example.
 I warn the hon. Gentleman again—I made this point in the first sitting—against selective misquotation of the Burns report. I cite paragraph 6.60: 
''Our tentative conclusion is that lamping using rifles, if carried out properly and in appropriate circumstances, has fewer adverse welfare implications than hunting, including digging out.''
 That helps us towards a conclusion and the construction of the Bill. It was one of the pointers in the Burns report that I took seriously into account. I want to demonstrate the way in which I then took the two principles that have been examined exhaustively over recent months to construct the Bill. Before I do that, I shall give way once more to the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle.

Gregory Barker: Leaving aside Mr. Marriage, I return to the question that I asked the Minister. The Minister said that he had taken into account a great deal of evidence before arriving at his conclusion. Lord Soulsby in the House of Lords said:
''many bodies have erroneously—I repeat the word ''erroneously''—quoted the Burns report, stating that it clearly demonstrated that the practice of hunting wild animals with dogs caused cruelty. The report did not state that.—[Official Report, House of Lords, 12 March 2001; Vol. 623, c. 564.]
 If we accept that, what was the clinical and scientific evidence that Lord Burns could not find that tipped the Minister towards that firm conclusion?

Alun Michael: First, the hon. Gentleman wants me to leave aside the philosophers that his right hon. Friend the Member for Suffolk, Coastal wishes to regard in coming to conclusions. Secondly, he wants us to look at the Burns report but, when it is not convenient, he does not want us to look at it. Then he wants a particularly selective quotation from a member of the House of Lords telling us what the Burns report did not say to inform our decisions. The hon. Gentleman is being ludicrous.
 If the hon. Gentleman will pay attention for a few minutes, I shall explain to him why the Bill has been constructed in the way that it has, but, before I do so, let me read again the sentence that I read a few moments ago from paragraph 6.60. It states: 
''Our tentative conclusion is that lamping using rifles, if carried out properly and in appropriate circumstances, has fewer adverse welfare implications than hunting, including digging-out.''
 In other words, Burns made a comparison of the degree of suffering in certain circumstances. He goes on to look at other circumstances. 
 It is a point that I wish to develop, particularly in response to the hon. Member for Montgomeryshire, in relation to the way in which we judge what is acceptable and what is not. It is not simply a matter of drawing a line and saying that that is the end of it. We must find the right principles against which to decide what is and what is not acceptable and we must have a clear framework in which to make that decision.

Peter Luff: I took a self-denying ordinance not to quote Burns.

Alun Michael: It did not last long, did it?

Peter Luff: I still do not intend to quote Burns. What interested me about the Minister's quotation from Burns was the way in which he glossed over quite a few words. It was not a selective quotation—it was there in full—but the emphasis was clear—''tentative'', ''if'', ''proper'', ''fewer''. It is hardly the robust conclusion that the Minister seems to want to imply. That is why the research that the Middle Way Group is launching on the real implication of shooting is tremendously important. Quotations are difficult things.

Alun Michael: No, the point that I was making was that the hon. Gentleman asked the wrong question. He asked me to produce a one-sentence solution to the whole issue, in which case we could have had a one-sentence Bill. We do not have that, because the situation is more complex than that. That is why the Bill is based on clear principles.
 If I were to quote more extensively from paragraph 6.60 and go on to later paragraphs, as I shall during our debates when we come to particulars, I could show hon. Members that Burns informs us, on the basis of the tremendous amount of work that he and his fellow commissioners did, in a way that illuminates discussion. I hope that many members of the Committee will look to the Burns report and to the evidence given at the hearings in Portcullis house to inform the debate. However, I ask hon. Members on 
 both sides of the debate not to quarry those two sources for single sentences that seem to give the answer to the problems of the universe and the price of fish, because it is not as simple as that. 
 Let us look at the available evidence so that we can apply the right principles to deciding what activities with dogs should be permitted and what should not, in what circumstances they should be permitted and how decisions should be taken when the issues are more marginal. In other cases, as I have suggested in the construction of the Bill, the for and the against will be quite straightforward. I shall come to those in a moment. 
 In dealing with the principles, I am especially glad that the hon. Member for Mid-Worcestershire has acknowledged that the key issue is how to put the two principles of utility and cruelty into the Bill. All Committee members should be able to agree that it is cruelty that we seek to eradicate. Many Members have criticised cruelty in hunting over many years but I suggest that there is an agreement in principle. The chairman of the Countryside Alliance, John Jackson, has several times said that if something is cruel, we should not be doing it. Similarly, we should all be able to agree that farmers and land managers must be able to protect their livestock and crops to do their jobs properly and safeguard their livelihoods. 
 Where it is not clear and conclusively shown that a particular activity is cruel, those who wish to undertake that activity should be able to have an opportunity to show that they need to deal with a particular pest and that there is no less cruel method available. In response to various contributions, including questions posed by the hon. Member for Montgomeryshire, I shall try to illustrate how that will work under part 2 of the Bill by referring to two activities. By applying the principles, I have concluded that one should be banned and the other permitted by the Bill. 
 The activity that I have concluded should be completely banned is hare coursing. The activity that I have concluded should be permitted is ratting. I can discuss that here because, as mentioned earlier, clause 8 both sets the scene for the decision-making processes in part 2 and underpins the Bill as a whole. Hare coursing is about comparing the speed and agility of the dogs, not catching an animal or pest. Catching may take place and suffering might be involved in that, but that is not the purpose of the activity. The utility test cannot, therefore, be satisfied. There is not utility in hare coursing. If the utility test were satisfied, we would go on to apply the cruelty test and ask whether the suffering involved was necessary; but the utility test is not satisfied. 
 Looking at ratting, there is a need to deal with the rat population to protect animal welfare and crops. The utility test having been satisfied, we can then apply the cruelty test. Is ratting the method that involves the least suffering? What are the alternatives? The use of poison and the use of trapping can affect species other than the quarry and involve a considerable degree of suffering. In general terms, therefore, not just in a particular circumstance, ratting passes the tests of utility and suffering. It is therefore an exception under the Bill. 
 My point there is that in those two examples, the conclusions of applying the utility and cruelty tests are clear. The same tests should be applied to other activities and where the conclusions are clear and straightforward, the matter is simple. Where they are more complex, a judgment must be exercised. The principles, however, are the same.

James Gray: The Minister is laying the principles out extremely clearly. Is the utility involved in catching pike that are inedible, then throwing them back, which presumably involves some cruelty, greater or less than that cruelty? Would the catching of pike be allowed under the tests in the Bill?

Alun Michael: In his initial statement, the hon. Gentleman indicated his close relationship with the Countryside Alliance. It is perhaps no surprise that repeatedly, like a broken record, he seeks to draw a conclusion in relation to dealing with wild mammals and apply it to fishing and other activities. I cannot see the relevance of his spurious political argument. The House has repeatedly considered the activity relating to wild mammals with which we are dealing and on which there is a clear will for Parliament to take decisions and to regulate. The principles in the Bill relate to wild mammals, and we are making judgments on them.

Hugo Swire: I apologise for moving back to the subject of fish. Given that the Minister is dealing in moral absolutes, I should welcome his opinion on how, if we were looking at the question of angling [Hon. Members: ''We are not.'']—Opposition Members are—he would he regard the use of a disgorger, which is found in most coarse fishermen's tackle boxes. How does he justify that in terms of cruelty and utility?

Alun Michael: I am not dealing in moral absolutes. There is no simple, moral absolute that one can apply. We have to deal with hunting, we should do so on a principled basis and I am setting out the principles that we should apply.
 I have been very interested in the moral discussion, which is a towering concept introduced by the right hon. Member for Sussex, Coastal. [Hon. Members: ''Suffolk!''] I apologise to Sussex. We should listen to what philosophers have to say, but there is a danger in trying to apply principles universally. We could reduce all legislation to one little Bill if it were possible simply to apply one principle, which is what leads to totalitarianism. The previous Government, of which the right hon. Gentleman was a member, created some problems because they applied principles without looking at their applicability in a variety of different contexts. My approach, which we commonly try to apply in our democracy, is to apply principles both consistently and with common sense in devising legislation that is apt and appropriate to the issue with which we are seeking to deal.

Mark Tami: On the earlier point, unlike the hon. Member for East Devon I have been a coarse fisherman for many years. A disgorger helps one to take a fish off a hook and return it to the
 water while it is still alive. I explain that to him in the same way in which I had to explain that Alyn and Deeside is in Wales and not in Scotland.

Alun Michael: Opposition Members expect an absolute knowledge of the geography of England, but not always of Wales. My hon. Friend represents a beautiful constituency.

Hugo Swire: The hon. Member for Alyn and Deeside (Mark Tami) is right to make that joke at my expense for the second time; no doubt he will come up with other jokes in due course. I know what a disgorger is about, and I am sure that a fish would be enormously relieved to have a hook removed from its mouth to be released in order to be caught again. He makes my point for me.

Alun Michael: I am delighted that the two Members are enjoying making each other's points. I do not intend to stray into a subject that has nothing to do with the Bill.

Lembit Öpik: Will the Minister give way?

Alun Michael: As I am about to answer the hon. Gentleman, it is an appropriate moment for him to intervene.

Lembit Öpik: The Minister said that there are no moral absolutes. It might be helpful if the definition, which has been muddled at times, could be phrased in the terms of an absolute. We are trying to ban cruelty and prevent unnecessary suffering, which is defined as suffering imposed on an animal that is not justified by utility. If we were to regard that as an absolute, we would no longer need to say that we are allowing this rather than that because it is less cruel. By definition, we would allow an activity because it is not cruel but ban another because it is. Leaving aside the other problems, we would reach an important agreement, probably across the Chamber, if we could at least agree on that.

Alun Michael: May I be precise? I said that I am not seeking to deal with moral absolutes. It may be that some people such as the right hon. Member for Suffolk, Coastal are—from his political history, he probably is. We should deal with the matter on the basis of principle but look for principles that are appropriate to the field of activity that we are seeking to regulate. The hon. Member for Montgomeryshire rightly pointed to the eradication of cruelty as a basic starting point for forming the right legislation.
 I wish to deal with a point that the hon. Gentleman made in his earlier contribution. When he spoke about an acceptable level of suffering—I believe that I have paraphrased him correctly—he described a process that would not work. There is no simple and objective measure, an equivalent for suffering of the Richter scale, that would give a measure of the suffering inflicted in any particular circumstance. 
 If there were, perhaps we should call it the Öpik scale. The registrar, who seeks to make judgments, would ask whether shooting reached force 5, whether hunting reached force 8 or whether poisoning reached force 7 or force 9 on the Öpik scale. In that way, he would know whether the cruelty of any activity was greater or less than that of hunting. Unfortunately, it ain't like that. The acceptability of an activity depends 
 on the suffering that it causes weighed against the question of whether it is a necessary activity. 
 Let us consider what the amendments would do to clause 8 and how the application of the principles of utility and cruelty might lead to the right conclusions in a wide variety of circumstances.

Peter Luff: The Minister is a much cleverer man than I am—he certainly thinks that he is. I listened to him carefully. Does he accept the concerns that led to the amendment? The proposal may not work in practice, and we have already accepted that the amendment may be flawed. However, banning one form of hunting may displace the killing of foxes to other more cruel methods. Does he accept that that risk exists in the legislation?

Alun Michael: If an activity is banned, there is a danger that people will replace it with something more cruel rather than less cruel, but I do not believe that the legislation pushes people in that direction at all. I am glad that the hon. Gentleman accepts that the amendment does not do the job that he intended, because I do not need to waste time criticising it.
 I made the point during interventions on the hon. Gentleman and the hon. Member for North Wiltshire that the legislation deals with hunting with dogs. If an activity is justified or there is utility in achieving a particular end, we must ask whether there is a less cruel way of achieving it than hunting with dogs. If there is a less cruel way, the activity of hunting is not justified. If the activity with dogs is the least cruel way, it is justified. 
 Both hon. Gentlemen sought in the amendment to deal not only with hunting but other potential forms of cruelty. The Bill is not the place to do that. I referred earlier, as did my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary, to the consultation that is underway on animal welfare issues. Other legislation will deal with other activities, just as there is legislation that deals with a variety of other ways of affecting the lives of animals.

Lembit Öpik: The Minister does not need to address our amendment in greater depth because I think that the principle is now established. He is saying that the difference between us is that we think that one has to take a holistic approach because that is the best way to improve animal welfare; that is what we think. If he thinks that we have such a different view, he has correctly prescribed the difference. He described the Öpik scale of suffering, but would he accept that regardless of that difference, the only way the registrar can make an objective judgement is by creating such a scale? Otherwise it will be impossible for the registrar to carry out what part 2 requires him or her to do.

Alun Michael: No, and I will come to the reason why the two principles had to be applied sequentially in a moment, and why that gets us out of the difficulty to which he is pointing.
 I want to say a word about the amendments in order to return to how the Bill would work in practice. The two key principles underlying the Bill are well known. It is encouraging that they are being examined with such care and treated with such seriousness, even if the way in which we achieve a balance and outcome may be a matter for the two sides to debate. The hon. 
 Member for North Wiltshire in opening said that clause 8 is at the heart of the Bill. That is absolutely right, and I am pleased that we are devoting such attention to the discussion. The principles have been well rehearsed, but I still think that they are being misunderstood or misinterpreted in a variety of ways. In particular, their application is being misunderstood. 
 The purpose of the Bill is to avoid any cruelty in hunting with dogs. The Bill will achieve that in a way that is fair and enables land managers and farmers to be able to protect their livestock, crops and the other aspects covered by clause 8(1) in a reasonable manner. The principles of the Bill are achieved by applying the two tests in sequence. That point of difference has come out clearly in the debate about the amendments. An applicant for registration first has to show utility. He has to show that he needs to achieve a particular outcome and that there is value and necessity in achieving that outcome. He then has to show that hunting with dogs is the method of achieving that utility in the circumstances that apply relating to his application in a way that causes the least suffering. Both tests have to be passed. It is not a question of balancing the two tests. 
 Amendment Nos. 100 and 101 would remove the requirement to pass both tests. Amendment No. 100 requires utility and suffering to be balanced. One effect would be that if an activity has greater utility, a greater degree of suffering would be authorised. By definition, that is unnecessary, and the suffering is avoidable. We would need the Öpik test and the Luff test to provide two measurements using the same units of measurement. To me, that is one of the essential problems in the way in which attempts have been made in the past somehow to balance utility and cruelty in the same test. That is not what I have done in the drafting of the Bill.

Peter Luff: That is something with which I have wrestled and I accept that the Minister has a point, but we do that all the time in legislating. We think about different issues in different ways. Regulating the way in which we drive is a classic example. We look at the advantages and the dangers of cars and reach a view of how to regulate them. We are having to balance different ideas all the time. I agree that that is difficult but I think that we could trust the registrar and the tribunal to reach judgments. We do not need equal units, but common sense.

Alun Michael: With the greatest respect, I do not agree with the hon. Gentleman. I think that, unintentionally, he would create a dangerous and unprincipled approach to hunting, based on the idea that the end justifies the means.
 In a few minutes I shall return to the Bill's central issue: how the two tests will be applied under clause 8 if the legislation is accepted. I referred to that briefly at the start of my response. Before I do that, I want to make clear the way in which the amendments, if accepted, would affect the Bill. 
 Amendment No. 101 would remove in its entirety the cruelty test as set out in the Bill, so would undermine the Bill's principal tenet. Amendment No. 174 imports the concept that the second cruellest method would be all 
 right, but we have discussed that argument and I do not need to answer it in greater detail now. 
 Amendment No. 24 would remove the word ''significantly'' from the test. The Bill seeks to avoid making close judgments on the cruelty of hunting, as against other methods of control of mammals, by requiring an individual to demonstrate that it clearly causes less pain or suffering. The word ''significant'' seeks to achieve clarity in the law. I do not think that there is a great point of principle separating me from my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West, in his amendment. The question is how to achieve the best law in practice. We are seeking to avoid the registrar or, in particular, the tribunal having to spend much time in futile arguments over minute differences in what is not an exact science. The ''significant'' will indicate what is not insignificant when it comes to comparisons, to protect the tribunal from a range of unsatisfactory or spurious arguments. 
 I am perfectly happy to continue a discussion on that point and have spoken briefly to my advisers about the impact of such an amendment, but it seems that it is worth trying to achieve the benefit of clarity for the tribunal. Perhaps my hon. Friend might like to have a further and more extensive discussion on that point outside the Committee.

Gregory Barker: Does the Minister not accept that the provision changes the whole basis of law as we understand it, by putting the onus of proof on the innocent rather than the guilty? Why is he making this extraordinary exception to persecute foxhunters, rather than any other class of person?

Alun Michael: That is an entirely inappropriate contribution. The measure is not about criminal justice but about the way in which someone who wishes to undertake an activity using dogs should make the case that that is necessary and not cruel in that particular context. The hon. Gentleman has got it entirely wrong.

Gregory Barker: But why do people who are setting out to shoot foxes, or snare or poison foxes, not have to make exactly the same case? You are clearly discriminating.

Marion Roe: Order. The hon. Gentleman should not say ''you''.

Gregory Barker: I am sorry. I do beg your pardon, Mrs. Roe.

Alun Michael: No, I am looking for the right principles to apply in order to answer the question ''Should any activity with dogs be allowed?'' My conclusion is that some activities with dogs, because they satisfy the test of utility, cruelty or least suffering, should be allowed. I take seriously the hunters' case that their activity is useful and that, if it were not allowed, we might fail to do things that are necessary for the management of the countryside, which could lead to greater cruelty. They have the opportunity to make the case.

Judy Mallaber: To return to amendment No. 24, does my hon. Friend the Minister understand that we want to exclude hunting
 if it is more painful or cruel than another method? Subsection (2) appears to be provide an easier test for hunting to pass than we would wish. We want to make the difference as minimal as possible. If there is any suggestion that hunting is more cruel than another method, we do not believe that it would be acceptable.

Alun Michael: I entirely understand my hon. Friend's point. Indeed, she made it when she spoke to amendment No. 24. However, it is a question not of degree but of certainty about how the clause should apply. I hope that in the spirit in which we have approached a number of the issues it will be useful to examine some of the legal precedents and the application of the wording, which appears in various pieces of legislation.
 As my hon. Friend said, we must look not only at what the Bill appears to say, but at what it says and will do in practice. I accept that we need to tease out—

Judy Mallaber: If, in practice, taking out ''significantly'' would do what we want without creating many more difficulties, it might still be preferable to do so to ensure that the Bill is understandable to the outside world. Therefore, there might still be an argument for removing the word ''significantly''.

Alun Michael: I understand my hon. Friend's point. The other side of ''significant'' is ''insignificant''. If there is an insignificant difference, it is not significant. That is logical. The advice that I have been given is that the word ''significantly'' in this context protects the registrar and the tribunal from technical debates about trivial comparisons of the relative suffering caused by different methods of control. If it does that, it enables greater certainty and speed in what can be done, instead of permitting the extension of spurile—I mean spurious and sterile—debates. [Hon. Members: ''Spurile?''] ''Spurile'' is a new word. I am sure that it will find its way into the Oxford English dictionary in the fullness of time.
 I understand my hon. Friend's point. I do not believe that there is any difference between us. The question is how we achieve the clearest possible formulation in the Bill.

Rob Marris: My hon. Friend the Minister can correct me if I have misunderstood him, but if he and I, as hon. Friends over a cup of coffee, agree that I have significantly less money than he does, that will be understood by both of us to mean that he is quite a bit wealthier than I am by perhaps several thousand pounds. However, if two legal draftsmen are talking about something significant, they are using the word ''measurable'' in one sense. Therefore, if one says ''I have significantly less money than you,'' it might mean 1p less as the most basic unit of currency. Is that the scenario that my hon. Friend is talking about?

Alun Michael: That is exactly my understanding of the difference between us. If the difference is not measurable, one is at the level of comparability where there is an insignificant difference, and that means that it would be possible to have all sorts of spurious and trivial arguments—I shall not try to invent another new word for the English language. The issue is worth teasing out. There is always a danger that we use
 terminology in an everyday way that is different from the way in which has been tried and tested from a legal point of view.

Alan Whitehead: Has my right hon. Friend considered the legal import of ''not insignificant'', as opposed to ''significant''?

Alun Michael: I should like to reflect on that contribution, but my hon. Friend may well be on to something. As I have said, I want to help those who seek to make amendments by ensuring that we discuss possible unintended consequences. I would be happy to consider the amendment, and the suggestion made by my hon. Friend, further.

Peter Luff: This is an interesting debate. In Standing Committees we often discuss what otherwise obvious words actually mean. When the Minister says it is worth teasing out, does he mean that he will return on Tuesday—I suspect that he will be interrupted quite shortly—having considered further what ''significant'' means? That would help us to debate subsection (1), because there are other amendments relating to ''significant''. It would be helpful if he would consider the word further, because the debate is important.

Alun Michael: I accept that and I will seek to help the Committee. The danger is that if the Bill does not indicate how a judgment should be made—effectively the judgment relates to the registrar or the tribunal perceiving whether there is a measurable or a not insignificant difference—it is possible that, in a general legal context, courts, or, in this context, a tribunal, might make up their own minds as to what the difference should be. From the advice that I have been given so far, I suspect that the difference would be minimal. It might even be insignificant. That is why I am willing to consider and discuss the matter further.

Lembit Öpik: It sounds like, having been chucked in the bin, the Öpik doctrine is back again, potentially in a form that we can agree on. Will the Minister clarify whether he accepts that we need a measure of the relative suffering caused in order to make an
 assessment about cruelty? If he does accept that, will not his least-suffering doctrine—the Michael doctrine—endanger the entire process? If there were 10 methods of killing foxes and the worst method got knocked out, the next worst would have to be knocked out by the same doctrine. That would continue until just one method was left.

Alun Michael: When I come to explain the application of the clause I hope that I will persuade the hon. Gentleman and other hon. and right hon. Members that the principles work very satisfactorily and that they should not amend the Bill. I do not think that what I want to see is any different from what my hon. Friends want to see. I am trying to tease out how we can ensure that subsection (2) is formulated in a way that makes the least-suffering test workable in practice. That is what I want to achieve. I do not think there is a great difference in principle.

Gregory Barker: I am aware that we are running out of time. If the legislation were enacted and foxhunting were banned, to all intents and purposes, throughout most of England and Wales, how could one explain the intellectual rationale to someone by saying, ''You may not hunt foxes with dogs because you cannot prove that it is significantly, or even slightly, less cruel than other methods''?

Alun Michael: The hon. Gentleman brings us back to the main mistake that a number of Opposition Members have made: namely, to talk about ''less cruel''. We need to consider what involves the least suffering, because that is what enables one to judge whether an activity is cruel. It is not a question of a bit of cruelty or of the Lembit scale of cruelty. To be fair, I think that the hon. Member for Montgomeryshire said that he wanted the Lembit scale of suffering to be the measure. We need to be careful about our language, otherwise we will lead ourselves astray and there will be a variety of unintended consequences.
 Debate adjourned.—[Mr. Ainger.] 
 Adjourned accordingly at Five o'clock till Tuesday 14 January at five minutes to Nine o'clock.